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1. Introduction
According to Jason Schultchen, none of Steven Hales’ (2013) five strategies for eliminating
disagreements will resolve a deep disagreement. Understanding why these strategies “simply
won’t do” shows us that a strategy that will do must (1) affect a change in the conceptual
frameworks of those who disagree, (2) offer a long-lasting solution and (3) involve
acknowledgement that the disagreement is real.
I shall discuss first Schultchen’s conception of a deep disagreement, then Hales’ five
strategies, and finally Schultchen’s three necessary conditions.
2. Schultchen’s conception of a deep disagreement
Schultchen inherits the concept of a deep disagreement from Robert Fogelin, who defines a deep
disagreement as one where the parties lack the “context of broadly shared beliefs and
preferences” (emphasis in original) and “shared procedures for resolving disagreements” that are
required for a “normal argumentative exchange” (Fogelin 1985, p. 3). In these comments, I shall
use the phrase ‘deep disagreement’ in this sense.
Fogelin resists the idea that the cause of deep disagreements is merely divergent
framework principles, which lie in the background but could be made explicit and rationally
discussed. When we probe deep disagreements, he claims, we
do not simply find isolated propositions ..., but instead a whole system of mutually
supporting propositions (and paradigms, models, styles of acting and thinking) that
constitute, if I may use the phrase, a form of life. (Fogelin 1985, p. 4)
In contrast, Shultchen accepts an analysis of deep disagreements as rooted in a clash of framework
principles that involve normatively fraught conceptual differences and an inescapable regress of
justifications for each party’s position.
It is not obvious that there are any deep disagreements. Fogelin’s examples-- disagreements
about the moral status of the human fetus and about whether groups have rights--have been the
subject of serious philosophical discussion, a sign that they are amenable to rational discussion
and that two people with initially divergent positions on either of them might have the resources
through protracted investigation and reasoning to come to an agreed final position. As Adams
(2005) points out, people trying to resolve a disagreement by argument never get to a stage where
they know that they have exhausted the resources of argument and reasoning, and so are never
justified in concluding that their disagreement is deep. To be justified in calling a disagreement
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deep, one needs substantial evidence that the parties who disagree have exhausted all the resources
that can become available to them for resolving their disagreement. Akin (2019) has explored a
disagreement that at first glance appears to be deep--the disagreement between proponents of the
“Dark Enlightenment” and adherents of the liberal-progressive consensus that they critique. He
has concluded that this disagreement is not so deep as to rule out productive argumentative
exchange, both about the positive program of those who portray the liberal-progressive consensus
as a grand illusion and about the existence of competing accounts of an alleged mass illusion and
of the reality on the other side. Akin finds in this analysis grounds for theoretical optimism that
“absolutely deep disagreements are impossible, since insofar as one can identify an other as one
with whom one disagrees, one must see that other as one with whom one can argue.” (Akin 2019,
p. 421)
It may therefore be a purely hypothetical exercise to consider how one might resolve a deep
disagreement. We can however take Shultchen’s analysis as a stipulative account of a kind of
disagreement that might or might not exist in reality, about which we can consider how the parties
might resolve their disagreement rationally.
3. Hales’ five strategies
To begin with, there is something odd about the notion of “disagreement elimination strategies”
(Hales, 2014, p. 64). If two parties disagree on some issue and either they or a third party want to
bring an end to their disagreement through discussion, it does not make much sense to start by
aiming for capitulation or compromise or disambiguation or scepticism or relativism. Rather, the
parties, perhaps with the help of a mediator, should start by exploring how and why they disagree,
and then continue the discussion to its logical conclusion. Often the parties will agree to disagree.
And why not? But discussion can eliminate an initial disagreement in various ways, which should
be called outcomes rather than strategies. With deep disagreements, two questions emerge for each
of Hales’ five outcomes. Can it happen? If it does, would it count as resolving the disagreement?
3.1 Capitulation
Schultchen thinks that one party to a deep disagreement might find an argument that would get the
other party to accept its position, but that this outcome would not count as resolving the
disagreement, since it would leave the parties’ clashing principles unaddressed. He treats the clash
of principles as a disease that must be cured. Since the metaphor is not obviously apt, he needs to
justify its use. In fact, mutually acceptable reasoned agreement on the issue at hand looks like a
resolution of the initial disagreement. However, if the initial disagreement is deep, the party that
capitulates must have made a mistake, since by definition the parties lack the shared beliefs,
preferences and resolution procedures required to arrive together at a jointly accepted conclusion
on the issue that divides them.
3.2 Compromise
Schultchen thinks that compromise can end a deep disagreement but does not resolve it, for it
settles what to do but leaves disagreement in place about what to believe. However, deep
disagreements can concern what to do rather than what to believe. In Canada, after the Supreme
Court ruled in January 1988 that the existing abortion law was unconstitutional, the cabinet had to
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decide on a replacement. According to Tromp (2013), cabinet members seem to have disagreed
deeply. On the face of it, their agreement after two years of discussion on a replacement law that
for many was a compromise looks like a resolution of their initial disagreement.
3.3 Disambiguation
Discussion can end a disagreement by finding a sense of a term or a context in which one party is
correct and another sense or context in which the other party is correct. As Schultchen points out,
this outcome is reasonable only where there is surface disagreement but fundamental agreement.
Deep disagreements cannot be rightly explained away as due to an ambiguity of sense or context.
3.4 Scepticism
Schultchen has two distinct objections to scepticism as a resolution of a deep disagreement. First,
he argues, suspension of judgment is untenable as a general position, because one has to decide
how to act. Second, a party to a deep disagreement cannot be forced or pressured to abandon its
own position. But, whether or not universal suspension of judgment is tenable, suspension of
judgment is a possible outcome of a deep disagreement and need not result from force or pressure.
Prolonged respectful discussion might lead the parties to recognize the origin of their disagreement
in competing framework principles, as well as the inability of either party to justify its principles
(or to refute the other party’s principles) to the satisfaction of the other. In fact, Feldman (2005)
has argued that suspension of judgment may be the rational response in the examples that Fogelin
(1985) uses of deep disagreements. And suspension of judgment looks like a resolution of the
disagreement.
3.5 Relativism
A relativist interprets each position as being valid only from the perspective of its proponent.
Schultchen accepts Lavorerio’s objection (Lavorerio, 2018) that relativism puts each party in the
impossible doxastic position of granting legitimacy to claims derived from a framework that it
regards as false. However, if each party to a deep disagreement makes the effort to understand the
other, each should come to realize that the other’s position is valid within the framework of its
governing principles. Each can still claim, while acknowledging this relativity, that its own
principles are the correct ones. But, on the other hand, each might come to abandon this claim and
to treat the choice of framework principles as open. The resulting relativism is hard to distinguish
from mutual suspension of judgment. It too looks like a resolution of the disagreement.
4. Schultchen’s conditions for a satisfactory strategy for resolving a deep disagreement
Schultchen’s three conditions articulate what he brings to his consideration of Hales’ five strategies
rather than what he takes from it. A deep disagreement is by definition a real disagreement, and
hence cannot be explained away as an illusion due to an ambiguity of sense or context. Ending a
deep disagreement by discussion only counts as a resolution if it comes to grips with the underlying
clash of framework principles; hence capitulation, compromise, mutual suspension of judgment
and retreat to relativism are not resolutions. As to being long-lasting, it is not clear to me why a
resolution of a deep disagreement needs to be long-lasting or that Schultchen has appealed to this
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requirement in considering Hales’ five strategies. In any case, the three conditions open space for
exploring how parties to a disagreement rooted in a clash of framework principles can overcome
this clash through discussion. For that purpose, one needs a broader conception of argumentative
exchange than that described by Fogelin or implicit in Hales’ terminology of “arguing to the point
of capitulation”—one that allows as Wohlrapp (2014/2008) for example does for subjectivity and
dynamism.
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